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HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN A
POST-IRAQ, POST-DARFUR WORLD: IS
THERE NOW A DUTY TO PREVENT
GENOCIDE EVEN WITHOUT
SECURITY COUNCIL APPROVAL?

SARAH MAZZOCHI*

Scores of ink have been spilled to address the question of whether there
is a duty to prevent genocide even without Security Council approval.
Most who have written on the subject have come down firmly supporting
the United Nation’s Charter and the general prohibition on the use of
force except for in situations involving self-defense or where use of force
has been approved by the Security Council. One of the main reasons
scholars have sided with the sovereignty1-Security Council side of the
debate is that aggressive states, if they could, would use unilateral
intervention for human rights reasons as a pretext for furthering their

* B.A., Brown University; J.D., Roger Williams University School of Law; LL.M
International Legal Studies Program, International Human Rights, American University Washington
College of Law. The author would like to thank Professor Keith Hagan for inspiring this article by
showing Hotel Rwanda in his Human Rights seminar. The author would also like to thank Professor
Juan Méndez for his contributions to this article. Lastly, the author would like to thank her
grandmother Ellen Gallagher for enabling her to live in Washington, DC as a poor law student and
for passing down her love of all things international.
1. Sovereignty, or rather the sovereign equality of all states, is often invoked as the main
reason intervention is lawful only with Security Council approval under the UN Charter.
Essentially, because all states are equal in the eyes of public international law, no state has the right
to interfere with another’s sovereign territory unless there is an extremely good reason to do so, such
as to prevent genocide. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para 1.
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own illegitimate policies, such as Hitler did when Germany invaded
Sudetenland in 1938.2
After a brief lull in human rights violations following the end of World
War II, human rights violations, especially genocide, seemed to emerge
again overnight in the 1990s and extend into the first decade of the 21st
century. Hundreds of thousands of lives were lost, and, in some cases,
the Security Council failed to act. The failure of the Security Council to
take action renewed the vigor of some scholars calling for a change in
the international legal landscape to properly address this reality.
Whatever momentum the legal community seemed to have gained in
recognizing a change in the law of humanitarian intervention was
brought to a halt during the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. However,
the genocide that occurred just a short while later in Darfur has renewed
this debate. And so, the question remains: Is there now a right to
unilateral humanitarian intervention in a post-Iraq, post-Darfur world?
This Article seeks to answer that question.
Part I will address the background and historical evolution of unilateral
humanitarian intervention as well as give examples of state action or
inaction in cases of genocide. Part I will also give the legal framework
for the U.N. Genocide Convention. Part II will discuss the law of
humanitarian intervention as it is commonly accepted today. Part III will
point to the future and argue that the law of humanitarian intervention
should be, going forward, a jus cogens norm. Part IV will offer a brief
conclusion about humanitarian intervention in situations amounting to
genocide, and it will point to what the future will likely be when there is
a duty to prevent genocide, regardless of Security Council approval.
I.

BACKGROUND AND EVOLUTION

A.

HISTORICAL EXAMPLES

(i)

1960-1990s

By some estimates, the use of force by states has occurred some 690
times since the passage of the UN Charter in 1945 until 1989.3 It has
been most often justified on the grounds of self-defense pursuant to
Article 51.4 However, many examples of unilateral humanitarian
2. Letter from Reich Chancellor Hitler to Prime Minister Chamberlain (Sept. 23, 1938), The
Crisis in Czechoslovakia Apr. 24-Oct. 13, 1938, in 19 INT’L CONCILIATION 433, 433-35 (1938).
3. See U.N. Charter; Herbert K. Tillema, Risks of Battle and the Deadlines of War:
International Armed Conflicts, paper presented to the INT’L STUDIES ASS’N, San Diego, Apr. 16-29.
4. U.N. Charter art. 51; Tillema, supra note 3.
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intervention date back to the 1970s.5 For instance, in 1971, India
invaded East Pakistan under the guise that it was an act of self defense
and because of the inhuman conditions suffered by the Bengali
population.6 The Security Council, and particularly the United States,
objected to India’s use of force.7 Vietnam invaded Cambodia in 1978 to
stop the Khmer Rouge’s genocide against its own people.8 Vietnam also
relied on the self-defense justification.9 The Security Council debated
this proposition with many states and asserted unilateral intervention for
human rights reasons was not permitted under the U.N. Charter.10
Tanzania invaded Uganda in 1979, and toppled the dictator Idi Amin
who had committed many atrocities against his people.11 Tanzania
partially relied on humanitarian grounds to do so.12 The attack was not
debated in the United Nations at all, but the international community
later derided Tanzania’s actions.13 France intervened in the Central
African Republic in 1979 after the atrocities committed by Emperor
Bokassa.14 The Organization of African Unity Judicial Commission
condemned his actions, but there was still no mandate by the world
community to intervene for humanitarian reasons.15
(ii) Rwanda (1994)
Perhaps the most famous modern example of the world community’s
inaction over gross human rights violations occurred in Rwanda in the
mid-1990s. In 1994, the Hutu majority in Rwanda began killing the
Tutsi minority population.16 Rwanda’s ethnic clash between the Hutus
and Tutsis was predominately a product of European colonialism.17
Germany, and later Belgium, colonized what is now known as Rwanda
in the 19th century and made a class system based on skin tone and facial
5. See ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 373 n.29 (Oxford Univ. Press, 2nd. ed.
2005).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. GARETH EVANS, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: ENDING MASS ATROCITY CRIMES
ONCE AND FOR ALL 135 (Bookings Inst. Press, 2008).
9. CASSESE, supra note 5, at 373 n.29.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Leilani F. Battiste, The Case for Intervention in the Humanitarian Crisis in the Sudan, 11
ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMP. L. 49, 61 (2005). For Hollywood’s take on the Rwandan Genocide, see
Hotel Rwanda.
17. SARAH HYMOWITZ & AMELIA PARKER, GROUP ONE: THE HUTUS AND THE TUTSIS,
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY WASHINGTON COLLEGE OF LAW CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND
HUMANITARIAN LAW, http://www.wcl.american.edu/humright/center/rwanda/jigsaw1.pdf?rd=1 (last
visited Apr. 27, 2011).
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features.18 The lighter skinned Tutsis were treated as being racially
superior to the darker skinned Hutus.19 Over the years, this created a
great deal of animosity towards the Tutsis, and the group was
periodically attacked.20 After 200,000 Tutsis were forced to flee to
Uganda, they regrouped into what was known as the Rwandan Patriotic
Front.21 Their aim was to achieve political equality for the Tutsis and to
counter the predominately Hutu government.22
Violence escalated throughout the early 1990’s and erupted in 1994.23 In
March of the same year, weapons were given to Hutu civilians.24 A
month later, Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana was killed when
his plane was shot down.25 The Tutsis, particularly the Rwandan
Patriotic Front, were blamed for the attack.26 The Rwandan army and
armed militia were deployed against the alleged perpetrators, and for the
next 100 days, a genocidal fury swept the small African nation.27 Most
of those killed were unarmed Tutsi civilians.28
Intervention was non-existent during the crisis.29 What is more
disturbing is that after the killings began, the U.N. Security Council cut
the U.N. forces in Rwanda from 2,500 down to a bare 800.30 The crisis
lasted for 100 days, and, when it was over, approximately 800,000
Rwandans had died.31 At the time, the U.N. and the world community
refused to call the crisis genocide.32 Several members of the Security
Council chose not to use the term “genocide” to describe what was
happening in Rwanda, because, if it was genocide, these states believed
there was a corresponding duty to prevent it.33
The failure to provide humanitarian intervention in Rwanda is considered
one of the worst international mistakes in recent history. Five years after
the killing began, President Clinton traveled to Rwanda to apologize for
18. Id.
19. See Battiste, supra note 16, at 62.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 61.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 61-62.
32. Id. at 62.
33. WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CRIME OF CRIMES 529
(Cambridge Univ. Press, 2nd. ed. 2009).
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not intervening, and he pledged that the United States would never again
fail to prevent such a catastrophe.34
(iii) Kosovo (1999)
The most commonly discussed example in recent memory of
humanitarian intervention without Security Council authorization, and
without a self-defense justification, was NATO’s intervention in Kosovo
in 1999.35 The Security Council had not authorized the intervention in
Kosovo, but many argued the need to use force was justified because of
the humanitarian catastrophe committed by the Serbs in Kosovo.36 The
United States, the United Kingdom, France, Canada, Belgium, the
Netherlands, and Italy, among others, supported the intervention.37 Other
states such as Russia, China, Cuba, Belarus, Ukraine, Namibia, and India
objected to the use of force because the Security Council had not
authorized it.38 Afterward, the integrity of the entire international system
was called into question with many considering the Kosovo intervention
justified on moral grounds because of the scale of the crimes against
humanity committed in the region, despite the fact that the intervention
was not authorized by the Security Council. 39
In 1999, NATO forces intervened in Kosovo to stop Slobodan
Milosevic's ethnic cleansing crusade against ethnic Albanians.40
Milosevic's goal was to dismantle any opposition to his regime and
permanently establish an ethnic balance in the region.41 NATO justified
the military intervention on the grounds that it was necessary for the
region’s overall stability.42 The Security Council failed to authorize the
intervention because of Russia’s veto.43
Despite not having Security Council approval for the intervention, U.N.
Secretary General Kofi Annan was supportive of NATO’s campaign. He
stated, “‘[there] are times when the use of force may be legitimate in the
pursuit of peace.’”44 He went on to say that "'ethnic cleansers' and those
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Battiste, supra note 16, at 63.
See CASSESE, supra note 5, at 373 n.29.
Id.
Id.
Id.
EVANS, supra note 8, at 129.
Battiste, supra note 16, at 59-60.
Id at 60.
Id.
Id.
Jane Stromseth, Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention, GEORGETOWN LAW
MAGAZINE (Spring 2002), http://www.law.georgetown.edu/alumni/publications/2002/magazine/
stromseth.html.
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‘guilty of gross and shocking violations of human rights’ will find no
justification or refuge in the U.N. Charter."45 Furthermore, after NATO
intervened, the Swedish-sponsored Kosovo Commission sought to make
the intervention more acceptable by distinguishing between legitimacy
and legality.46 It contended that while the intervention may not have
been legal, it was nevertheless legitimate.47
(iv) Iraq (2003)
The Security Council was again bypassed when the United States and her
allies invaded Iraq in 2003 based on notions of self-defense found in
U.N. Charter Article 51.48 The alleged goals were to disarm Iraq of
weapons of mass destruction, end Saddam Hussein’s support of
terrorism, and free the Iraqis from a brutal regime.49 However, no
weapons of mass destruction were found in Iraq, which resulted in the
entire legitimacy of the military operation being called into question by
many.
The cause of Iraq’s intervention in 2003 was found in Iraq’s noncompliance with the Gulf War’s cease-fire terms throughout the
1990’s.50 Security Council Resolution 1441 was adopted after the U.N.’s
somewhat ineffective handling of Iraq’s non-compliance during this
time.51 Resolution 1441 gave Iraq “a final opportunity to comply with its
disarmament obligations,” and “set up an enhanced inspection regime
with the aim of bringing to full and verified completion the disarmament
process” established by Resolution 687 and other resolutions.52
However, it was evident that the United States would resort to force if
necessary.53 The Security Council also declared that “Iraq has been and
remains in material breach” of its disarmament obligations, and further
failures to comply with Resolution 1441 would “constitute a further
material breach.”54 The British viewed Resolution 1441 as a “second
45. Id.
46. EVANS, supra note 8, at 139.
47. Id. (Fourteen principles were used to determine legality versus legitimacy.)
48. Id. at 132.
49. President George W. Bush’s Radio Address, President Discusses Beginning of Operation
Iraqi Freedom (Mar. 22, 2003), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/
2003/03/20030322.html.
50. See Jules Lobel & Michael Ratner, Bypassing the Security Council: Ambiguous
Authorizations to Use Force, Cease-Fires and the Iraqi Inspection Regime, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 124,
150-52 (1999); Ruth Wedgwood, The Enforcement of Security Council Resolution 687: The Threat
of Force Against Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 724,724-25 (1998).
51. Jane E. Stromseth, Law and Force After Iraq: A Transitional Moment, 97 AM. J. INT’L L.
628, 630 (2003).
52. S.C. Res. 1441, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1441 (Nov. 8, 2002).
53. Stromseth, supra note 51, at 630.
54. S.C. Res. 1441, supra note 52, ¶ 1, 4.
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resolution,” and wanted to achieve a consensus in the Security Council.55
The United Kingdom especially wanted to enhance the legitimacy of any
later forceful action by working within the confines of the U.N.
Charter.56
The United Kingdom’s Prime Minister, Tony Blair, and his Foreign
Secretary, Jack Straw, argued for a unified force with the Security
Council’s approval.57 France refused to authorize force under any
circumstances.58 The United States, the United Kingdom, and several
other notable allies forcibly intervened anyway, which was supposedly
acceptable under Security Council Resolution 1441. However, their
actions have been greatly criticized.59 Nevertheless, immediately before
the invasion, Tony Blair spoke about the use of force and its consistency
with Security Council demands on Iraq.60 Blair argued that the U.N.’s
weak stance on Iraq’s non-compliance undercut its credibility and sent a
poor message to other dictators and tyrants.61 He stated, “to will the ends
but not the means . . . would do more damage in the long run to the U.N.
than any other course.”62
Some have called the Iraq military intervention the "death" of the U.N.
Charter and the end of "the grand attempt to subject the use of force to
the rule of law."63 Experts agree that this morbid assertion was
premature, but it was clear that the pendulum had swung towards the use
of legitimate and legal force only with Security Council approval.64
However, the question now is whether the legitimacy of the use of force
only with Security Council approval is still true after the atrocities
committed in Sudan, especially in the Darfur region.
(v)

Sudan (2003-Present)

Sudan is the largest state in Africa.65 It has also been constantly
immersed in civil wars since its independence from Great Britain in

55. Stromseth, supra note 51, at 631.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See id.
60. Tony Blair, PM Statement Opening Iraq Debate in Parliament (Mar. 18, 2003),
http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page3294.asp.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Michael J. Glennon, Why the Security Council Failed, 82 FOREIGN AFF. 16, 24 (May/June
2003).
64. See Stromseth, supra note 51, at 629.
65. Battiste, supra note 16, at 51.
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1956.66 The predominately Muslim government exists in the North,
while most of the non-Muslims, many of whom are Christian – mostly
Catholics and Anglicans – reside in the South.67 Since its independence,
over two million people, mostly Christian, have been killed in the
conflict.68
The crisis primarily took place in a region known as Darfur, which is a
diverse area home to Arabs and other African groups including the
Masalit, Fur, and the Zaghawa.69 These three groups, who are mainly
farmers, have borne the brunt of North Sudan’s policies.70 The early
part of the conflict involved a clash over land between Arab nomads and
the African farming villages.71 The Fur began resisting nomadic
intrusions on their land, which resulted in government hostilities against
the Fur.72 Eventually, the Fur formed militias, which later became part
of the Sudanese Liberation Army (“SLA”), a rebel group.73 In the 1990s,
Arab nomads moved onto land mostly held by the Masalit farmers,
which resulted in further armed hostilities between the two groups.74
The government ended the violence, but tension continued between the
Arab nomads and black African groups.75 During the following years,
the Sudanese government failed to improve roads and public services
used primarily by black African groups and awarded top government
posts to Arabs.76
Hostilities boiled over early in the morning on April 25, 2003 when a
SLA bomb exploded at a small airport where Sudanese soldiers were
located.77 The SLA then killed the remaining soldiers, took over the
military outpost, and captured the head of the Sudanese Air Force.78
Sudan’s government responded by coordinating air strikes with the local,
newly-armed Arab tribesmen known as the janjaweed.79 This strategy
66. U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: Sudan (2011),
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/su.html .
67. Hope for the Future International, Christianity in Southern Sudan: The History of
Christianity
in
Sudan,
http://www.hopeforthefutureinternational.org/about-southern-sudanchristianity.php (last visited Apr. 29, 2011); Battiste, supra note 16, at 51.
68. Battiste, supra note 16, at 51.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See id. at 52.
72. Id. at 52.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 53
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Samantha Power, Dying in Darfur, 80 THE NEW YORKER 58, (Aug. 30, 2004). Available
at: http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2004/08/30/040830fa_fact1.
79. Id.
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laid the foundation for the later brutalities committed against the
unarmed black African citizens, including mass murder and rape.80
Since 2003, at least 70,000 civilians have been killed in Darfur and
approximately 1.85 million people have been internally displaced.81
Again, the international community failed to act promptly to prevent this
humanitarian catastrophe. In fact, at first, only the United States referred
to this crisis as genocide.82 Over a year after the conflict first began, the
SLA and the Sudanese Government signed a temporary cease-fire with
the African Union agreeing to send unarmed troops to monitor the
situation.83 It was only in late July 2004 that the Security Council passed
a resolution imposing an arms embargo on the fighting forces and
threatened the government with other actions such as freezing assets or
issuing a travel ban.84 Finally, in February 2005, the Security Council
approved sending 10,000 troops as part of a U.N. peacekeeping mission
– nearly two years after the violence began.85
In 2008, Omar al-Bashir, Sudan’s current president, was indicted for
genocide by the International Criminal Court.86 Southern Sudan held a
referendum on whether to remain part of Sudan in early 2011.87 The
people of Southern Sudan overwhelmingly voted for their independence
from the North and will likely become an independent state by July
2011.88
Having laid out the historical framework for intervention with or without
Security Council approval up to the present day, it is now necessary to

80.
81.
82.

Battiste, supra note 16, at 53-55.
Id. at 49.
See Dana Milbank, Denying Genocide in Darfur – And Americans Their Coca-Cola,
WASH. POST, May 31, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2007/05/30/AR2007053002157.html. See also U.N. News Centre, U.N. Commission Finds Sudanese
Government Responsible for Crimes in Darfur (Feb. 1, 2005)(The United Nations referred to the
crisis as a series of “indiscriminate attacks” but not genocide). Available at: http://www.un.org/
apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=13199&CR=sudan&Crl=; Battiste, supra note 16, at 50.
83. Battiste, supra note 16, at 58.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 50, 58-59.
86. Sudanese President is Charged with Genocide, MSNBC, July 14, 2008,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25671505/ns/world_news-africa/
87. Josh Kron, Big Push in South Sudan Before Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/10/world/africa/10sudan.html?partner=rss&emc=rss
88. Faith Karimi, Report: Vote For Souther Sudan Independence Nearly Unanimous, CNN,
Jan. 22, 2011, http://articles.cnn.com/2011-01-22/world/sudan.referendum.results_1_preliminaryresults-official-results-election-officials?_s=PM:WORLD; Sudan Referendum: What’s Being Voted
On and What Will Happen?, THE TELEGRAPH, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/
africaandindianocean/sudan/8246615/Sudan-referendum-whats-being-voted-on-and-what-will-happen.
html (last visited May 30, 2011).
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turn to the Genocide Convention and how humanitarian intervention
relates to the crime of genocide.
B.

THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION

The definition of genocide is the “intentional killing, destruction, or
extermination of a group or members of a group as such . . . .”89
Historically, genocide was thought of as a crime against humanity, not as
its own distinct offense.90 For instance, the Tokyo International Tribunal
never specifically mentioned genocide when dealing with the Holocaust;
instead, the crime was considered was one of persecution.91
Genocide became a specific crime in 1948 with the adoption of the U.N.
Genocide Convention.92 The Genocide Convention carefully defines the
crime: it punishes more than genocide itself but also acts connected with
genocide, such as conspiracy to commit genocide; it affirms that
genocide can occur during wartime and peacetime; and it establishes
individual criminal responsibility along with international state
responsibility.93 The Genocide Convention is widely acknowledged as
representing customary international law as well as holding to a status of
jus cogens.94 Importantly, jus cogens is a peremptory norm of
international law upon which no derogation is possible.95 Accordingly,
jus cogens is afforded the highest status in international law and, in some
ways, is akin to natural law.96
The Genocide Convention has a specific act and specific intent
requirement.97 It requires that the genocidal conduct (a) include the
killing of members of a racial, ethnic, or religious group; (b) cause
serious mental or bodily harm to members of the group; (c) bring about
the group’s physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) prevent births
within the group; or (e) forcibly transfer children of the group to another
group.98 The conduct does not need to be systematic or widespread for
there to be genocide, although this is often the case.99

89. CASSESE, supra note 5, at 442.
90. Id. at 442-43.
91. Id. at 443.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 444.
95. Id.
96. See, e.g., LAURI HANNIKAINEN, PEREMPTORY NORMS (JUS COGENS) IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW: HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT, CRITERIA, PRESENT STATUS 357-424 (Coronet Books, Inc).
97. CASSESE, supra note 5, at 444-45.
98. Id. at 444.
99. Id.
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The mens rea, or specific intent, of genocide is that the perpetrator
committed one of the aforementioned acts intending to destroy the group
in whole or in part.100 Murder, for example, is the means while the goal
or end, would be the group’s destruction. Therefore, genocide cannot
exist when the conduct is negligent or even reckless.101
Although the Genocide Convention does many things well, it is not
without its problems.
For example, the Genocide Convention’s
definition of genocide has been criticized as not being broad enough to
include cases of cultural genocide or genocide on political grounds.102
Moreover, the enforcement of the Genocide Convention has not been
very effective.103 In the history of the U.N., the General Assembly
pronounce a case of genocide only once in Sabra and Shatila in 1982.104
Moreover, in the sixty years since the Genocide Convention’s passage,
very few prosecutions for genocide have occurred globally.105
(i)

The Duty to Prevent Genocide

Article 1 of the Genocide Convention provides that contracting states
have a duty to prevent genocide.106 In practice, in 1993, with the
outbreak of war in Bosnia, some argued that states have the duty to
prevent genocide.107 As Judge Lauterpacht wrote, “[t]he duty to
‘prevent’ genocide is a duty that rests upon all parties and is a duty owed
by each party to every other [erga omnes].”108 This viewpoint
corresponded with the early International Court of Justice case
Barcelona Traction.109
In the 2005 Outcome Document of the Summit of Heads of State and
Government, the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) embraced this
“responsibility to protect” for crimes of genocide.110 The Court made this
responsibility a treaty obligation for those states that ratified Genocide

100. Id. at 445.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 443.
103. See UNGA Resolution 37/123 D of 16 December 1982 (the only time the General
Assembly proclaimed a situation constituted genocide under the Convention.).
104. See id.
105. CASSESE, supra note 5, at 443 n.19.
106. Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, art.1, Jan. 12, 1951,
78 U.N.T.S. 277.
107. SCHABAS, supra note 33, at 527 (Judge Lauterpacht’s comments).
108. Id.
109. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3
(Feb. 5, 1970); see also SCHABAS, supra note 33, at 527 (Judge Lauterpacht’s comments).
110. 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶ 138-39, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Oct. 24,
2005).
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Convention Article IX without reservation.111 Moreover, regarding the
responsibility to protect, the Court saw no distinction between genocide
committed on a state’s own soil and genocide committed elsewhere.112 It
is now clear that the duty to prevent genocide is not confined to a state’s
own territory.113
In the Case Concerning the Application of Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v.
Serbia and Montenegro), the ICJ also affirmed that, when carrying out
the duty to prevent genocide, states must still act according to established
international law principles and with respect for the U.N. Charter.114 The
Court did not go so far as to hold that the duty to prevent genocide, or the
responsibility to protect those groups suffering from genocide, trumps
the U.N. Charter or allows states to intervene without Security Council
approval.115 Nevertheless, as renowned experts agree, the duty to prevent
genocide is “very much a work in progress.”116
In the Case Concerning the Application of Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v.
Serbia and Montenegro), the International Court of Justice further
clarified the duty to prevent genocide. State responsibility under the duty
to prevent genocide, according to the Court, is triggered when the state
involved fails to take all measures within its power to prevent the
crime.117 The obligation “varies greatly from one State to another,” and
depends on a state’s capacity to influence events.118 Factors such as
geographic proximity and the strength of ties between the states should
be considered.119
Having now established what the Genocide Convention is and what it
does, the next section will discuss the current law of humanitarian
intervention.

111. Id.
112. Id; see also SCHABAS, supra note 33, at 524.
113. SCHABAS, supra note 33, at 524.
114. Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide (Bosn. &
Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), 2007 I.C.J. ¶ 426 (Feb. 26).
115. Id; see also SCHABAS, supra note 33, at 525.
116. SCHABAS, supra note 33, at 533.
117. Id. at 521.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 521-22.
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II.

THE LAW OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AS IT
STANDS TODAY

A.

BASIC PRINCIPLES OF NON-INTERVENTION

123

U.N. Charter Article 2(4) makes clear that all states “shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force . . . .”120 According
to the U.N. Charter, states are justified in using force only when
authorized by the Security Council to prevent the most serious threats to
peace under Article 42, or in cases of self-defense under Article 51.121
Therefore, in many ways, international peace and security firmly rests
with the five permanent members of the Security Council: The United
States, France, Great Britain, Russia, and China.
(i)

Unilateral Intervention Without Security Council Approval

By the late 1990s, many international experts suggested that, due to the
responsibility to protect and the duty to prevent genocide found in the
Genocide Convention, unilateral humanitarian intervention was required
even in cases where the Security Council failed to authorize such
action.122 The concept of humanitarian intervention without Security
Council approval, although not a new phenomenon, took further root in
NATO’s intervention in Kosovo.123 It was even argued that the duty to
prevent genocide, not just the duty not to engage in genocide, had
reached the level of jus cogens.124 Therefore, any incompatible duty –
even one in the U.N. Charter – could not stand in the way of states
fulfilling this jus cogens obligation.125
More recently, however, justifying humanitarian intervention when the
Security Council has not authorized the use of force has been not been
favored by the international community in the wake of Iraq’s invasion in
2003.126 For instance, the International Court of Justice in Nicaragua
(merits) (§268) held that state parties agreed that “whether the response
to the [armed] attack is lawful depends on observance of the criteria of
necessity and the proportionality of the measures taken in selfdefence.”127 Experts like Antonio Cassese, despite some state practices
120. U.N. Charter art. 2, para 4.
121. U.N. Charter arts. 42, 51; CASSESE, supra note 5, at 373.
122. SCHABAS, supra note 33, at 530.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 531.
127. Case Concerning the Military and Paramilitary Activities In And Against Nicaragua
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 194 (June 27).
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to the contrary, have gone so far as writing, “ . . . legally entitling
individual States to take forcible measures to induce a State engaging in
gross and large-scale violations of human rights to terminate such
violations, has not crystallized.”128
However, even Cassese notes that the opinio juris for unilateral
humanitarian intervention is internationally widespread.129 Opinio juris,
after state practice, is the second element in customary international law,
and it stands for the position that states act under a belief that they are
legally obligated to do so.130 For example, the 2000 Constitutive Act of
the African Union, a treaty ratified by 53 African States, holds that there
is a right to intervene, if allowed by the African Assembly, when there
are grave human rights violations such as genocide.131 This seems, at the
least, to directly contravene the U.N. Charter, which requires that the
Security Council, and only the Security Council, may authorize the use
of force.
The World Summit in 2005 demonstrated a renewed commitment to the
U.N.’s general prohibition on the use of force, especially unilateral use of
force.132 The Summit Outcome Document, which was unanimously
decided, once again asserted that the Security Council was the sole
international body for authorizing the use of force.133 Therefore, it seems
likely that the law surrounding humanitarian intervention continues to
require that the use of force be authorized by the Security Council or be
used in cases of self-defense.
Having reaffirmed the international commitment to the Security Council,
the question now turns to what the future of international law will be for
intervention in mass atrocities.
III. THE FUTURE OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AS JUS
COGENS
At least one advocate for human rights has expressed the opinion that
“[a]ll notions of sovereignty with respect to Rwanda should be
128. CASSESE, supra note 5, at 374.
129. Id.
130. ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES: A LEGAL REAPPRAISAL 69
(Cambridge Univ. Press 1995) (“[State practice] . . . is the repetition of conduct by an increasing
number of States, accompanied at some stage by the belief that this conduct is not only dictated by
practical (economic, military, political) reasons, but is also imposed by some sort of legal command
[opinio juris].”).
131. CASSESE, supra note 5, at 374.
132. EVANS, supra note 8, at 132.
133. Id.
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completely forgotten and we should just go in and stop the killing.”134
While the law may currently favor the position that humanitarian
intervention is only legal when authorized by the Security Council, or in
cases of self-defense, the question is, should it be?
A.

EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE PRETEXT
ARGUMENT JUSTIFYING NON-INTERVENTION

Perhaps the main reason scholars, international lawyers, and the
international community support the principles in U.N. Charter Article
2(4) and the idea that the use of force is only justified in cases of selfdefense or when authorized by the Security Council is that, if states
could, they would use humanitarian intervention as a pretext for
satisfying their own selfish ends.135 Recent empirical evidence, however,
suggests that unilateral humanitarian intervention would have little effect
on the frequency of unjustified and aggressive wars, and in some cases,
may even reduce the number of such wars.136 According to at least one
scholar, essentially not enough attention is paid to domestic political and
social factors forcing state officials to justify their aggressive
tendencies.137 Moreover, “encouraging aggressive states to justify using
force as an exercise of humanitarian intervention can facilitate conditions
for peace between those states and their prospective targets.”138
Therefore, if new empirical evidence shows that pretext is not one of the
horrible consequences awaiting the legalization of unilateral
humanitarian intervention, little else should justify states not meeting the
duty to prevent genocide, or having that duty be regarded as jus cogens.
B.

RECOGNIZING THE DUTY TO PREVENT GENOCIDE AS JUS COGENS

Those who envision a different method of preventing human rights
catastrophes rather than relying on action by the Security Council
typically do so in two main ways.139 First, there are those who argue that
customary international law has indeed crystallized to allow state
134. Nobel Laureate Wole Soyinka, May 1994, quote in L.A TIMES May 11, 1994, at B7. ; see
also Ian Browlie, Thoughts on Kind-Hearted Gunmen, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE
UNITED NATIONS 139 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1973) (calling this view the position of the KindHearted Gunmen).
135. Ryan Goodman, Humanitarian Intervention and Pretexts for War, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 107,
113 (2006).
136. Id. at 107. (“In this article, I argue that it is just as likely, or even more likely, that the
impact on states would be the opposite. Drawing on recent empirical studies, I contend that
legalizing [unilateral humanitarian intervention] should in important respects discourage wars with
ulterior motives.”).
137. Id. at 109-110.
138. Id. at 110.
139. EVANS, supra note 8, at 136.
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intervention for serious human rights reasons even without authority
from the Security Council.140 Second, there are those who believe the
Security Council system should be strongly reformed or replaced
entirely.141 This Article accepts a third justification for rethinking the law
of unilateral humanitarian intervention – that the duty to prevent
genocide should be, if it is not already, jus cogens.
Under international law, only the highest of legal principles is afforded
jus cogens status.142 According to the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights, jus cogens derives “their status from fundamental values
held by the international community, as violations of such preemptory
norms are considered to shock the conscience of humankind and
therefore bind the international community as a whole, irrespective of
protest, recognition or acquiescence.”143 Common examples of jus
cogens norms are the prohibitions on genocide and slavery, although
many scholars have noted that the duty to prevent genocide must be
counted among this group.144
Moreover, the founder of modern international law, Jesuit scholar
Francisco Suarez, strongly believed that the right of self-defense is the
“greatest of rights.”145 Following this logic, some have argued that the
duty to prevent genocide as jus cogens naturally flows from even the
foundation of international law.146 As jus cogens, the duty to prevent
genocide would be superior to all other international obligations,
including the sole right of the Security Council to approve the use of
force found in U.N. Charter Article 42 and the right of self-defense in
Article 51.147
Conversely, international scholar William Schabas rejects the idea that a
jus cogens duty to prevent genocide could somehow trump the U.N.
Charter. He writes:

140. Id.
141. Id.
142. See David B. Kopel, Paul Gallant, & Joanne D. Eisen, Is Resisting Genocide a Human
Right?, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1275, 1327 (2006); M.N. Shaw, Genocide and International Law,
in INTERNATIONAL LAW AT A TIME OF PERPLEXITY 797, 800 (Yoram Dinstein ed., 1989); Louis
Rene Beres, After the Gulf War: Prosecuting Iraqi Crimes Under the Rule of Law, 24 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 487, 490-91 (1991); Amnesty Int'l, United States of America: A Killing that No
Respectable Government Can Condone, AI Index AMR 51/033/2003 (Mar. 4, 2003).
143. Domingues v. United States, Case 12.285, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Report No. 62/02 (Oct. 22,
2002).
144. See id; Kopel et al., supra note 142, at 1328.
145. Kopel et al., supra note 142, at 1328.
146. Id.
147. Id.
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Perhaps the most serious objection to the idea that humanitarian
intervention to prevent genocide is permissible because it is a jus
cogens norm is the fact that the prevention of the use of force
subject to the two exceptions mentioned in the Charter, Chapter
VII action and self-defence, is also a jus cogens norm.148
Other scholars like Mark Toufayan disagree with Schabas’
Schabas fails to fully distinguish between the
interpretation.149
prohibition against genocide, which is jus cogens, and the duties flowing
from the norm.150 The relationship between the duty to prevent genocide
and the prohibition against the use of force do not conflict, because “an
intervening state or group of states agrees to violate a jus cogens rule in
order to prevent the violation of another rule of the same character.”151
Moreover, because these are competing equal jus cogens norms – the
duty to prevent genocide versus the prohibition on the use of force found
in U.N. Charter Article 2(4) – methods of reconciliation should be
used.152 Accordingly, the two competing norms should be interpreted
harmoniously so that the apparent conflict is not, in fact, genuine.153 For
example, U.N. Charter Article 2(4) prohibits the use of force only in a
“manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”154
However, the duty to prevent genocide is consistent with the “Purposes
of the United Nations,” because preventing genocide, at its essence, is
about “reaffirm[ing] faith in fundamental human rights,” and “[saving]
succeeding generations from the scourge of war” – language found in the
Preamble to the U.N. Charter.155 Lastly, the duty to prevent genocide is
an absolutist principle, unlike the prohibition on the use of force in
Article 2(4), which permits two exceptions.156 Therefore, if ever in
conflict, the duty to prevent genocide should always prevail.
The duty to prevent genocide will be seen as a jus cogens obligation
sometime in the near future, if it is not already. As seen above, there
148. WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CRIME OF CRIMES 502.
(Cambridge Univ. Press, 2000)
149. Mark Toufayan, The World Court’s Distress When Facing Genocide: A Critical
Commentary on the Application of the Genocide Convention Case (Bosnia and Herzegovina v.
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)), 40 TEX. INT'L L.J. 233, 257-258 (2005).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and
Expansion of International Law, Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 58th sess, May 1-June 9, July 3Aug. 11, 2006, 25, U.N. Doc.A/CN.4/L.682 (2006).
153. Id. at 27.
154. U.N. Charter art. 2, para 4.
155. U.N. Charter preamble.
156. See id. at arts. 41, 52.
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need not be a conflict between the prohibition on the use of force and the
duty to prevent genocide. Moreover, the fear that states will use
humanitarian intervention as a pretext for their own aggressive
tendencies is not empirically supported. Therefore, little stands in the
way of international law allowing states the right to intervene in grave
human rights catastrophes, such as in cases of genocide. Thus, the duty
to prevent genocide, like the prohibition on genocide, should be jus
cogens.
IV. CONCLUSION
The old notions of sovereignty cannot be allowed to stand in the way of
human rights. International law is changing, and changing quickly.
Genocide is rightfully considered the “crime of crimes,”157 and
international law should reflect this. The law in most instances follows
reason and prevailing morality, and reason and morality call for greater
intervention to prevent human rights catastrophes. The pendulum is
swinging this way after Sudan. Someday soon the law will reflect the
truth that perhaps the only thing worse than genocide itself is knowing
about it and doing nothing. Some states, such as the United States, seem
willing to act – sometimes rightly (Kosovo) and sometimes wrongly
(Iraq) – to address the gravest human rights violations. Other states, such
as Vietnam in Cambodia and France in the Central African Republic,
have at one time or another also fought against human rights violations.
Someday soon the duty to prevent genocide will be jus cogens. Until
that day, states must be ready to violate international law because the
international community can ill afford another Sudan, Kosovo, Rwanda,
or Holocaust.

157.

See generally SCHABAS, supra note 33.
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